# Transmission Line Siting Constraints

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March 15, 2001

### Interconnection Disputes are Barriers

- Consume time and resources
- Costs mount while the clock ticks
- Competitors advance their positions

## Uniform Interconnection Study Process

- Recognize both benefits and impacts
  - Reduced RMR cost
- Expanded operating limits
  - Reduced output at local generators
  - PTO's responsibility, not the generator's
- CAISO should resolve technical disputes over interconnection plan.

### 60 days for an SIS or DFS is fine.

- DFS has been up to 180 days.
- Often, neither timeline is met.
- Exception: SIS requests for small units responding to urgent needs

## Litigating interconnect requirements at the CEC invites delay.

- CAISO process should determine the technical interconnection requirements.
- CAISO's determination should be definitive and should not be litigated in the AFC process.

### Queuing creates impediments.

- SIS/DFS may not be valid if an earlier project stalls.
- Requirements may be unduly onerous until "vaporware" projects are removed.
  - Too expensive to "reliably connect"
  - More difficult to permit
- Projects should meet milestones or lose place in queue.

## Let market decide between generation and transmission.

- Market mechanism so non-transmission alternatives can compete transmission.
- Regulators should determine that the alternative selected by the market mechanism is environmentally acceptable.
- Changing to a single regulatory authority is not essential.

### Congestion affects generation siting decisions.

- Recognition lags development.
- Developers converge on the "good" spots
- Often too many projects under way before congestion becomes apparent.

### Can new generators impact transmission access for existing generators?

- That depends on the rules for access.
- In some areas, existing generators have all the access rights.
- In California, "in place" generators and new generators compete for access.
  - Promotes economic efficiency.

## Can congestion keep existing generators from the market?

- Depends on the response of the PTO and the CAISO to an interconnection request.
- Reactionary response: "Congestion is not our problem."
  - uneconomic congestion
  - higher energy prices
  - higher RMR costs
  - narrow supply margins

## Can congestion keep existing generators from the market?

- Proactive response: "We'll provide new transmission to reasonably mitigate local congestion."
  - enhances reliability
  - increases the depth of the market
  - reduces the delivered cost of energy
- Will keep local congestion within reason and attract new generation.

## Limited access for older generation can affect the supply adequacy.

- Today's situation: Inadequate supply
  - Need to avoid congestion so new and old generators can both run.
- Desired future situation: Ample supply.
  - Old generation should be retired as dictated by market conditions.
- Access should not be assured for old units that are not competitive.

- Automated remedial action schemes enhance transmission capability
  - Good long-term solutions for infrequent contingencies
- Uneconomic transmission congestion should be mitigated.
  - PTO and CAISO should be proactive.
  - New transmission may be warranted.

- The grid planning process should mitigate uneconomic congestion.
  - Perhaps state involvement and funding if the CAISO and PTOs won't do it.
- An effective market mechanism for congestion mitigation may not be practical.
  - recognizes the benefits to all parties
  - rewards each party commensurately

- Problems if generators own transmission.
  - Compromises EWG status.
  - Disputes likely over allocation of incremental capacity.
  - The generator's share of the mitigation benefits alone may not justify mitigation.

 Reliance on the "market" to sponsor economic transmission reinforcements is a prescription for "do nothing", which experience shows if often the wrong solution.